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During the course of an election cycle, candidates often deliver vague statements 
regarding their positions on policies. Furthermore, incumbent candidates typically have a 
record of obscure actions unknown to the voter. Presently, existing literature maintains 
ambiguity in terms of an interaction between the candidate and the constituent. 
According to this literature, candidates use ambiguity to exploit voter uncertainty on 
policy issues. However, I argue that congressional members, motivated by re-election, 
will act similarly to candidates by utilizing ambiguity. In this research, I propose that it is 
the president’s popularity that triggers a congressional member’s ambiguity. Using a 
method of linear regression, I measure the rate of congressional ambiguity from 1996 to 
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In 2015, Republican Senators Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio sparred over 
immigration during a GOP presidential debate. Rubio accused Cruz of supporting the 
legalization of undocumented immigrants. Cruz fervently denied these charges. Instead, 
he stated: “I have never supported legalization, and I do not intend to support 
legalization” (Sarlin 2015). Some in the news noted that it was “the furthest that Cruz 
[had] gone in outlining whether he would allow more than 11 million undocumented 
immigrants to continue living in the U.S. through an earned pathway to citizenship or 
legalization” (Sakuma 2015). 
Rubio’s accusation was in reference to statements Cruz made in 2013. That year, 
members of Congress (MCs) were bitterly divided over immigration reform. The Gang of 
Eight bill represented a bipartisan effort that offered, among other things, a 13-year 
pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants (Sarlin 2015). Cruz opted for 
“common-sense immigration reform” and proposed three additional amendments be 
added to the bill. Cruz’s primary amendment called for removing the pathway to 
citizenship component, but it also offered a route to work permits and green cards for 
undocumented immigrants (Sarlin 2015). 
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Cruz stated: 
If the objective is to pass common sense immigration reform that 
secures the borders, that improves legal immigration, and that allows 
those who are here illegally to come in out of the shadows, then we 
should look for areas of bipartisan agreement and compromise to come 
together… (Saletan 2015) 
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Although “out of shadows” alludes to the legalization of undocumented 
immigrants, Cruz never explicitly stated that he was in favor of legalization. Following 
his speech, numerous articles reported on Cruz’s “careful words in 2013” that allowed 
him to “avoid being locked down as in favor of legalization” (Kim 2015).  
With the intention of bettering their political images, maintaining their voting 
bases, or to avoid being held accountable, politicians may purposely choose to be 
unforthcoming on their political positions through their remarks or actions. Vague 
statements, avoiding roll-call votes, burying bills, and quiet lobbying are practices 
routinely utilized by MCs and presidents (Page 1976). Therefore, political ambiguity has 
become a common practice in all facets of government. 
 Congress and the presidency differ with respect to the number of terms they can 
serve in their position. While MCs are not limited by the number of terms in office they 
can pursue, presidents are constitutionally prohibited from pursuing more than two 
consecutive terms in office. Thus, serving in Congress does not necessitate a short-term 
endeavor. It often becomes a career.  In 2014, the Senate published an extensive profile 
on the 113th Congress. The average length of service for a member of the House was 9.1 
years or 4.6 terms (Manning 2014). Meanwhile, a member of the Senate, on average, 
invested 10.2 years or 1.7 terms of service (Manning 2014). Therefore, maintaining a 
positive image is crucial for any MC seeking re-election, and MCs would prefer not to 
detract or destabilize their political image. 
 Richard F. Fenno Jr.’s research on congressional behavior concluded that voters 
are typically supportive of their MC but disapprove of Congress as a collective whole 
(Fenno 1978). If Fenno’s assessment is to be believed, Congress’s popularity is irrelevant 
3 
 
to individual MCs who seek re-election. The focus of each MC is centered on his or her 
perception among the constituency. Therefore, to maintain and collect more votes, they 
are incentivized to preserve a positive image in relation to their constituents. 
However, unlike Congress, the presidency is confined to a single person, and the 
president’s popularity is a direct reflection of public opinion. Thus, MCs will consistently 
monitor the president’s popularity to gather insight on the general public’s mood. Given 
that the underlying goal of MCs is to preserve their seats, it may be in their best interest 
to be ambiguous on certain issues during the course of a presidency. By doing so, an MC 
adjusts to the voter’s opinions and enjoys a favorable perception among constituents. 
 To what extent is the rate of political ambiguity demonstrated by MCs dependent 
upon the president’s popularity? I argue that, in an effort to preserve their political 
images, MCs will demonstrate political ambiguity as the president’s popularity declines. 
The extent of ambiguity will be contingent upon partisanship. Republicans may be more 
ambiguous under a Republican president, and Democrats may be more ambiguous under 
a Democratic president.  
Nevertheless, by choosing to remain ambiguous, lawmakers avoid remarks and 
positions that are negatively associated with the presidency. Essentially, they distance 
themselves from a potential political firestorm. Furthermore, they reduce the likelihood 
that these positions and remarks will be used against them during an upcoming election 
cycle. Therefore, I believe that exercising political ambiguity gives sitting MCs greater 
flexibility to conduct their affairs without immediate fear of reprisal by their constituents. 
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 To my knowledge, the argument I make is the first of its kind. Much of the 
research surrounding political ambiguity focuses on candidate and voter behavior during 
an election cycle. Scholars have identified voter uncertainty on policy issues and the 
candidate’s exploitation of that uncertainty as cause for political ambiguity. This 
research, by contrast, represents a departure from current research on political ambiguity. 
First, this research examines in-office behavior rather than candidate behavior. Second, I 
consider the president’s popularity as an alternative explanation for the political 
ambiguity demonstrated by sitting MCs. 
 Therefore, I anticipate this research adding a new dimension to the current study 
of ambiguity. While scholars have studied the ambiguity exemplified by candidates, they 
have failed to consider the ambiguity demonstrated by MCs as a potential and new area 
of study. Thus, the results of this research may offer congressional scholars a new course 
of study on the behavior of sitting MCs. 
 This research investigates the relationship between these new variables, briefly 
discusses the payoffs to being ambiguous, and seeks to add dimension to existing 
literature. I begin with a discussion of factors related to my theory. Then, I outline the 
methodology for this research, which is predominantly quantitative. Finally, I conclude 
with an overview of the results from this research and a series of future considerations on 
the topic of political ambiguity.  
Literature Review 
 At present, there is no research that connects the president’s popularity to 
congressional behavior as a possible explanation for political ambiguity. For this reason, I 
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explain the dynamics of the president’s popularity with emphasis on his or her perception 
in public and the reaction by Congress. While the president’s approval ratings may 
constitute as the trigger for congressional member ambiguity, internal ambition may 
prove to be an extension of that trigger. Because ambition propels elections and it 
establishes voting patterns, it is reviewed. Finally, since current research on ambiguity is 
modeled after candidate behavior and I assume ambitious MCs act similarly to 
candidates, I discuss current theories of political ambiguity among candidates. 
 
Presidential Popularity 
Throughout the campaign process, a presidential candidate outlines an agenda. 
When elected, a president must have legislative support to fulfill that agenda. Research 
suggests that this agenda is supported by MCs when his or her popularity is relatively 
high (Bond and Fleisher 1984; Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha 2007). This is especially true 
for areas of domestic policy and support in the House (Edwards 1976). Because of 
electoral security concerns, Senate and House members are generally responsive to the 
president’s popularity among their constituents (Edwards 1976). In fact, members with 
greater electoral vulnerability are often more likely to be responsive to their constituents 
as opposed to members that are electorally assured (Cohen, Bond, Fleisher, and Hamman 
2000).  
Any decline in the president’s popularity is a result of the public’s assessment on 
his or her performance along “social, economic, and international” fronts (Ostrom and 
Simon 1985, 354). Furthermore, scholars have noted the connection between a decline in 
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public expectations of the president and a decline in the president’s popularity based on 
his or her job performance (Sigelman and Knight 1983). The two are interrelated. Thus, 
taken together, much of the president’s popularity among the public requires the support 
of Congress, and if the president is to maintain support, he or she must be able to 
persuade MCs to complete his or her agenda (Ostrom and Simon 1985). 
Although the president’s popularity is a national-level indicator of public 
approval, many studies have argued that there is a weak or mixed relationship between 
congressional support and presidential popularity (Borrelli and Simmons 1993).  Bond 
and Fleisher (1980) found that public approval of the president may not influence 
Congress to legislate on his or her proposals. Therefore, the ability of the president to 
pass his or her agenda and gain public approval may largely depend on the party in 
control of Congress (Bond and Fleisher 1980; Bond, Fleisher, and Wood 2003). 
Furthermore, MCs from districts with high presidential electoral performance are likely 
to be more responsive to presidential popularity (Borrelli and Simmons 1993).  
Still, some research has denied the relationship between the number of 
congressional votes the president receives and the president’s popularity (Bond and 
Fleisher 1984). Instead, it is public opinion that indirectly affects support for the 
president’s agenda in Congress (Bond and Fleisher 1984). Bond and Fleisher, in quoting 
Tufte (1975, 826), reiterated that midterm congressional elections are a referendum 
where “voters reward or punish the President” (Bond and Fleisher 1984, 304). But, 
because voters have specific information on the president’s support in Congress, “it is 
unlikely that members of the President’s party can avoid punishment at the polls by 
lowering their support for an unpopular President, or that members of the opposition 
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party can benefit greatly by increasing their support for a popular President” (Bond and 
Fleisher 1984, 305). In concluding, they suggested that the president’s popularity 
determines his or her success in Congress by influencing the number of members who 
win seats in Congress (Bond and Fleisher 1984; Lockerbie, Borrelli, and Hedger 1998). 
These members translate into votes that are useful in passing the president’s agenda, and 
they could result in the preservation or achievement of legislative control. 
If the president’s popularity is related to the fulfillment of his or her agenda and 
that agenda relies on legislative support, the president is cornered when Congress is 
unwilling to work with him or her. So, if elections are an area of particular concern for 
MCs and voting records are public, it should be expected that Congress would offer its 
support to the president’s agenda, particularly members of the president’s party.  
However, Congress is rewarded by the public with higher levels of approval when 
conflicts with the president result in legislative vetoes (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 
1997). MCs also enjoy increased public approval when two conditions are jointly met. 
First, the majority in Congress and the president must share the same party. Second, 
Congress, the majority ideally sharing the president’s vision, must support the president’s 
agenda (Patterson and Caldeira 1990). Achieving a federal government under single-
party control has become exceedingly rare. Since 1980, there have only been five 
instances of united government, and a united government does not guarantee that 
congressional-presidential relations will be tension-free (Struyk 2017).   
Furthermore, research has long determined that legislators are rewarded when 
they vote along their constituents’ preferences (Jones 2011; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and 
Cogan 2002). However, the preferences of constituents may not always align with the 
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president’s agenda. What a Democratic city of the North regards as important may be 
entirely different than that of a Democratic city of the South. Thus, why should Congress 
be concerned with passing legislation related to the president’s agenda if it does not align 
with the values of its constituents? The answer may be partially explained by the degree 
of political ambition a politician possesses.  
 
Political Ambition 
MCs may defect from the president’s agenda due to the degree of political 
ambition politicians hold. The field of politics has been compared to a career ladder that 
lawmakers climb beginning at the local level to the national level (Fox and Lawless 
2005). For some MCs, serving on Capitol Hill is only a stepping stone. The office of the 
presidency or cabinet positions represent the highest step of national politics, and sitting 
MCs with ambition are still far from that point. For other ambitious MCs, who are 
expendable, simply maintaining their seat is enough. Thus, ambitious MCs, who desire to 
climb or remain on the ladder, that are concerned with an unpopular president might be 
willing to risk ambiguity to save face. 
Joseph Schlesinger, a pioneer of research on political ambition, divided ambition 
into three categories. Discrete ambition is when lawmakers are forthcoming about the set 
number of terms they wish to seek in a single office, and they admit they will retire at the 
end of that term (Herrick and Moore 1993). Static ambition occurs when a politician 
intends to make a career out of a particular office (Herrick and Moore 1993). Finally, 
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progressive ambition is one where a politician intends to attain higher levels of office or 
to climb the ladder of politics (Herrick and Moore 1993).  
Herrick and Moore (1993) propose there is a fourth type of ambition distinct from 
Schlesinger’s ambitions. Intrainstitutional ambition involves a politician intentionally 
seeking a leadership position, like Speaker of the House, within the institution they serve 
(Herrick and Moore 1993). Evidence has shown that there are ambitious members of the 
House that enter office with the intention of obtaining a leadership position within the 
House in the future (Herrick and Moore 1993).  
Politicians with an interest in pursing a career in politics are ambitious. 
Congressional scholars have found evidence suggesting that sitting MC’s policy stances 
are influenced by their desire to pursue further terms (Hibbing 1986; Maestas 2003). 
Furthermore, research on state legislators has concluded that progressive ambition often 
compels them to closely monitor the preferences and opinions of their constituents 
(Maestas 2003).  
Recall that progressive ambition is for politicians with aims to achieve higher 
offices. At the national level, discounting that Congress is nearly the top of the ladder, 
there are a limited number of seats in leadership positions within Congress. The House 
and Senate are composed of committees and subcommittees and majority and minority 
leadership positions. These seats are not available every election cycle, and there is no 
guarantee that certain contenders, with intrainstitutional ambition, are predisposed to win 
the position.  
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Therefore, it would be wise for politicians at the national level, as with any level, 
to maintain static ambition to hold their seats if lawmaking is their career, and if they 
have a leadership position in mind, to continue to take actions that place them closer to 
that goal. For MCs, expressing ambiguity, at a point when public support for the 
president is low, may be the difference between salvaging their career and essentially 
terminating it. 
 
Theory of Political Ambiguity Among Candidates 
If MCs appear before the media and their constituencies, it is difficult to 
comprehend why they would choose to be vague or to avoid touting a position while in 
office. Voting records are easily accessible, and the media reports on and broadcasts 
legislative activity. Politicians are employees of their constituency. If they cannot 
complete the simplest of tasks, like adequately representing the interests of their 
constituency, an employee would expect to face reprimand or dismissal by an employer. 
Therefore, fear of dismissal should encourage lawmakers to be clear about every policy.  
However, this entire assumption depends on an actively-informed voting 
population, but scholars have discovered that voters are often ill-informed (Abbe, 
Goodliffe, Herrnson, and Patterson 2003). Furthermore, most lack a “consistent set of 
personal beliefs against which they can judge candidates' positions” upon (Abbe, 
Goodliffe, Herrnson, and Patterson 2003, 420). 
Some researchers have suggested that ambiguity may be advantageous to the 
candidate (Tomz and Van Houweling 2009; Karp and Garland 2007). Because a 
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candidate may be uncertain about his or her voter’s preferences, he or she has no 
incentive to vocalize a clear position (Glazer 1990; Milita, Ryan, and Simas 2014).  
Glazer (1990) posits two reasons for candidate ambiguity. First, voter turnout for 
elections may be so random that the candidate may not be aware of the median voter 
preference when he or she announces a position (Glazer 1990). Second, the conditions 
may change between the present and Election Day in such a manner to influence voter 
preference at the ballot box (Glazer 1990). Glazer (1990) argued that “a deteriorating 
economy, foreign crises, [and] financial panics can…alter the preferences of voters” 
(238). Hence, voter preference is highly unpredictable.   
For some voters, ambiguity is a plus factor in elections, and as such, they may be 
willing to risk voting for the ambiguous candidate. Evidence also suggests that when 
voters are less confident in their personal positions on legislative issues, they select the 
ambiguous candidate (Tomz and Van Houweling 2009). In this case, voters perceive 
ambiguity as being correlated to flexibility, which aligns with the nature of politics. No 
two days are alike on Capitol Hill and possessing flexibility would be an asset.  
Lastly, Tomz and Van Houweling (2009) determined that voters may overlook the 
ambiguity of their party’s candidate based on the belief that the candidate will choose a 
position that aligns with their preferences in due time. In this scenario, party loyalty 
ultimately dictates a candidate’s actions. 
If demonstrating ambiguity is beneficial, why would candidates announce their 
position on anything? Under the emphasis allocation theory, candidates emphasize issues 
where voters have agreement (Page 1976). For example, voters are united in their desire 
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for a thriving economy, but candidates may be vague on how they plan to pursue policies 
that benefit the economy. Often, ambiguous stances are based upon controversial or 
divisive issues, like military spending (Page 1976). Therefore, when candidates allocate 
emphasis, they emphasize shared goals and demonstrate ambiguity on the specifics of 
those goals. In his research, Page (1976) concluded that the optimum allocation of 
emphasis would include attention to a “range of issues with nods to some specificity” 
(730). Therefore, when politicians make targeted campaign appeals, political ambiguity 
should be utilized on issues in which consensus is nonexistent (Hersh and Schaffner 
2013). 
In my paper, I will address the nature of congressional ambiguity. I assume that 
MCs actively mimic the behavior of a candidate due to the volatility of their career 
choice. In other words, they must pursue policies that are certain to benefit their images 
and constituencies. If the consensus among scholars regarding the political knowledge of 
most voters and the potential voter indifference to ambiguity hold, MCs should look to 
ambiguity as a safety net. Using theories behind ambition, MCs will be acutely aware of 
the president’s popularity as a national-level indicator of public approval and should 
choose ambiguity when the president’s popularity declines. The fear would be that the 
defeat of an unpopular president, the ultimate spokesperson of the party, results in 







Ambiguity is characterized by a deliberate refusal or hesitation to take clear stances 
on political issues. A segment of the research that I have outlined above concludes that 
ambiguity allows a candidate to capitalize on a disillusioned constituency. If the candidate 
fails to strike first, his or her opponent may seize the opportunity, and, as a result, 
potentially win the voter. 
 Literature on political ambiguity has consistently focused on candidates as the 
primary source of ambiguity (Karp and Garland 2007; Militia, Ryan, and Simas 2014; 
Hersh and Schaffner 2013; Tomz and Van Houweling 2009; Glazer 1990). Furthermore, 
previous research has explained ambiguity in terms of a rational choice between 
candidates seeking an edge in a close election or the candidate’s exploitation of voter 
uncertainty on policy issues (Glazer 1990; Tomz and Van Houweling 2009). Therefore, 
scholars have failed to consider the ambiguity demonstrated by MCs as a potentially new 
area of study. As such, I have discussed the factors that I believe influence or better 
explain the original theory I propose. 
To what extent is the rate of ambiguity demonstrated by MCs dependent upon the 
president’s popularity? In this paper, I argue that there is a distinct relationship between 
the president’s popularity among the public and the ambiguity demonstrated by MCs.  
The president’s popularity is significant to my theory. The extent to which the 
president is popular among the public dictates the support he or she can be expected to 
receive in Congress. If the president’s popularity is low among the public, the likelihood 
of defection along the president’s agenda and distancing from the president increases. 
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Using this same logic, members of the president’s party would be especially incentivized 
to alienate themselves from the president if they seek re-election in the future.  
I suggested that ambition may be responsible for an MC’s decision to defect from 
the president’s agenda when his or her popularity is low. It also serves as an explanation 
as to why MCs may be ambiguous. Ambitious MCs see the president’s popularity as an 
indicator of public approval and, by extension, approval of the president’s agenda. These 
MCs, particularly members that share the president’s party, therefore, ought to be 
concerned when the president’s popularity declines because opponents could tie the MC 
to the president’s unpopular actions and behavior in future elections. Thus, ambiguity is a 
rational alternative when courting voters because it does not alienate the member’s 
current base or offend the potential voter.  
 Because the president is the leading spokesperson of his or her party, when he or 
she experiences defeat in the legislative arena, the media is likely to report on the 
president’s failure and MCs that share the same party (Lebo and O’Geen 2011). A series 
of legislative defeats may result in lower assessments of the president’s performance 
among the public (Ostrom and Simon 1985). As a result, the president’s popularity will 
subsequently decline. The assumed fear among MCs, especially those of the president’s 
party, is that the president’s declining popularity among citizens will translate into 
disdain for individual MCs. The interaction between a shared ideology and ambiguity 
results in the formation of my hypothesis: 
H1: If the president’s popularity declines, then congressional members of 
his or her party are more likely to demonstrate ambiguity than 
congressional members of the opposing party. 
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The likelihood that the MC utilizes ambiguity is ultimately conditioned on 
whether they are ambitious. An unambitious MC would care little for his or her 
constituency’s preferences. By contrast, ambitious MCs would be more responsive to 
their constituencies’ preferences for maintenance of their seats or furthering of their 
political careers.  
Because MCs do not have term limits, if these members are interested in 
policymaking as a career, they must think in advance and make decisions that benefit 
their political images. If an MC’s constituency has a negative opinion regarding the 
president, to avoid future punishment at the ballot box, I believe the ambitious MC will 
show ambiguity. Ambiguity, after all, cannot hurt candidates.   
By distancing themselves from negativity, they prevent their political opponents 
from gaining the upper hand in upcoming elections, and they potentially maximize 
support among their constituency. I expect to find that a decrease in the president’s 
popularity, reflecting the opinion of citizens, should trigger ambitious politicians to show 
ambiguity in an attempt to salvage their image and maximize constituency support.  
Survey data on the president’s approval in each state is not recorded. If this were 
the case, an MC would be more inclined to rely on this data when making the decision to 
utilize ambiguity. However, because this is not the case, the president’s approval at the 
national level is the closest measurement MCs have in understanding the general mood of 
the public. Given that the MC is unaware of his or her constituent’s actual opinions of the 
president and his agenda, ambiguity should be the rational choice because the national 
sentiment may be reflective of local sentiment. 
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 While much of the research on political ambiguity explores its practice used by 
candidates, I believe that ambitious MCs that seek re-election in the future will act much 
like a candidate. Candidates have an incentive to win the seat by demonstrating 
ambiguity on salient issues during an election cycle. Sitting MCs, however, have a 
motive to maintain their seats by being ambiguous with regard to their support for 
legislation under a president with low approval ratings. When the president’s popularity 
is low, his or her agenda and actions are not supported among citizens. Supporting an 
unpopular agenda becomes a gamble for the MC when he or she is unaware of their 
constituent’s opinions.  
 
Research Design 
 This quantitative study explores the relationship between the president’s 
popularity and the political ambiguity demonstrated by members of Congress using a 
method of OLS regression.  
The dependent variable is the rate of political ambiguity demonstrated by MCs 
(The dependent variable is denoted as Presidential Approval * Same Party in the 
Appendix.). To represent the dependent variable, I gather data from VoteView (Lewis, et 
al. 2017). This variable is measured by a statistic that predicts the MC’s position on 
legislation. Thus, it predicts the expected vote to be cast by the MC based upon his or her 
ideology and voting record. If the statistic in VoteView hovers around 50, signaling that 
the MC’s position is a tossup, then the congressional member will have demonstrated 
political ambiguity. Each statistic from VoteView will be ranked based upon its distance 
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from 50 or the point of complete ambiguity. For instance, a value of 0 in my dataset 
signifies that the MC has met total ambiguity, while a value of 50 in my dataset signifies 
that the MC has demonstrated no ambiguity. 
The main independent variable in this research is represented by the president’s 
popularity. Data on presidential popularity is gathered from Gallup polling and will be 
measured by a percent out of 100 (Gallup 2018).  
There are four control variables. The political party of politicians must be 
controlled for due to its potential influence on the rate of ambiguity. For example, there 
may be a Republican president and a Democratic Congress which could hinder the 
progression of policy. Data for this control variable is collected from VoteView. Second, 
the presence or absence of divided government should be controlled for due to its effect 
on the rate of ambiguity. Data for this control variable is gathered from VoteView. MCs 
under a united government should be less prone to ambiguity given the presence of a 
shared majority party. Finally, midterm and presidential election years should be 
controlled for due to their nature. MCs are likely to use ambiguity during election years 
to maximize their support. 
Although data on the House and Senate are separated in this research, I do not 
control for the congressional chamber. Observations in the House exceeded the storage 
capacity of Excel, and therefore, I could not append Senate data onto the same file. Thus, 
I separated House and Senate data into separate files to ensure the data could be 
accurately measured.  
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To capture a sample from Democratic and Republican presidencies, data from 
Gallup polling and VoteView were collected on Congresses for a period of twenty years, 
between 1996 to 2016. All MCs within the twenty-year time frame are included in the 
research. The units of analysis in this research are individual MCs and all legislation from 
1996 to 2016. 
 
Analysis 
I hypothesized that the rate of ambiguity among MCs that share the president’s 
party would increase as the president’s popularity declined.  
The House sample included over 4.5 million observations. Results from Table 1 
(See appendix.) reveal that there is some support for my hypothesis (.133***). As the 
president’s popularity declines, members of the House in the president’s party exercise 
more ambiguity on legislation. 
 The presence of divided government makes House members less ambiguous (-
.781***). Although statistically significant, midterm years (-.123***) exerted more 
negative influence on the dependent variable than presidential election years (.261***) in 
the House. Midterms see less ambiguity than presidential elections in the House. 
 The Senate sample included over half a million observations. Results from Table 
2 (See appendix.) indicate that the Senate offers some support for my hypothesis 
(.024***). As the president’s popularity declines, senators in the president’s party 
exercise more ambiguity on legislation. 
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 Like the House, the presence of divided government results in senators being less 
ambiguous (-.895***). Finally, senators are more likely to avoid ambiguity during 
presidential election years (-1.09***) than midterm election years (-.089). Results from 
the Senate on midterm election years reveal no statistical significance. 
Because research using multiplicative interactions is often flawed, I use Clarify to 
examine dependent variable values from the House and Senate based on varying levels of 
the president’s popularity (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). 
The president’s popularity in the House dataset averaged at 49.9. The mean for 
the predicted level of ambiguity among House members that shared the president’s party 
was 41.3. At one standard deviation above the president’s popularity, this value decreases 
to 40.9. At one standard deviation below the president’s popularity, this value increases 
to 41.6. 
The mean for the predicted level of ambiguity among House members that do not 
share the president’s party was 42.6. At one standard deviation above the president’s 
popularity, this value decreases to 40.9. At one standard deviation below the president’s 
popularity, this value increases to 44.3.  
The president’s popularity in the Senate dataset averaged at 51.5. The mean for 
the predicted level of ambiguity among members of the Senate that shared the president’s 
popularity was 41.5. At one standard deviation above the president’s popularity, this 
value becomes 41.2. At one standard deviation below the president’s popularity, this 
value becomes 41.8. 
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The mean for the predicted level of ambiguity among senators that do not share 
the president’s popularity was 40.5. At one standard deviation above the president’s 
popularity, this value decreases to 40.0. At one standard deviation below the president’s 
popularity, this value increases to 41.1. 
 I theorized that the president’s popularity accounted for the ambiguity among 
MCs. Given that the presidency is a central focus of media attention, it seemed plausible 
that any decrease in his or her popularity at the national level reflected negatively on 
MCs from the same party. However, results indicate that there is some support for this 
theory. There are two reasons this theory failed to yield stronger results. 
First, the president’s popularity is not a stable measurement. One week, the 
president may experience a surge in approval. Another week, the president may say or do 
something that warrants the disapproval of the public. It would be irrational for an MC to 
respond to the president’s popularity in this context. Therefore, a consistently low 
approval rating is missing in this research.  
Second, the president’s popularity at the national level is not a reliable 
measurement. It is what the average citizen thinks. However, it may not be what the 
MC’s constituent thinks. Therefore, an independent variable originating closer to home is 
missing from this research. For instance, the presidential election results in each state 
would be a reliable measurement because an MC knows precisely what his or her 
constituent is thinking. Furthermore, congressional election results could serve as a 
precursor for ambiguity, especially if the victory margin is narrow. 
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Although the results yielded from this study were unexpected, they have 
generated new approaches to my hypothesis. Because the president’s popularity at the 
national level is a broad measurement, future research on ambiguity should arise from 
measurements closer to home. Results from presidential and congressional elections at 
the state level represent a reliable and stable source of popularity. As such, a new 
approach should consider the president’s victory or loss in each state as a cause for 
ambiguity in the congressional member. Furthermore, another approach should consider 
each congressional member’s victory margin as a precursor for ambiguity. 
Once a reliable and stable independent variable is established, the topic of 
ambiguity should be further evaluated. In the following section, I suggest alternative 
measurements of ambiguity and other avenues of study for political ambiguity. 
 
Conclusion 
The primary objective for the theory of congressional member ambiguity is to 
determine a stronger cause of ambiguity in Congress. I have offered two different 
approaches that could yield stronger results and prove to be a better independent variable. 
Given that ambiguity among congressional members represents a new area of study, I 
present nine ways future scholars can continue research on congressional member 
ambiguity.  
First, are women less likely to be ambiguous than men in Congress? Research has 
discovered that women are more likely to be viewed as honest and trustworthy among 
their constituents, and ambiguity represents a deliberate attempt to be deceitful 
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(Schneider and Bos 2014). Thus, women, in keeping with their reputation of honesty and 
trustworthiness, should be less likely to demonstrate ambiguity in Congress. 
Second, is the practice of ambiguity more evident among incumbents or freshman 
members of Congress? Scholarship on the incumbent advantage suggests that incumbents 
are more likely to win elections over their challengers (Carson, Engstrom, and Roberts 
2007). Freshmen lack this advantage, and as a result, they may be more willing to be 
ambiguous to appease their bases in preparation for the next election. They are electorally 
vulnerable, and ambiguity provides a sense of security. In contrast, incumbents are more 
electorally secure. They may practice less ambiguity because they are more familiar with 
their constituency, or they may feel more empowered to pursue their own preferences 
without fear of reprisal by their electorate.  
Still, incumbents may be more ambiguous because they are certain to elude 
punishment by the voter. The incumbency advantage, under the right set of 
circumstances, guarantees an easy win for the incumbent. A freshman member of 
Congress may feel pressured to announce a position for every legislation to appease their 
electorate in preparation for the next election. 
Third, are members of the House or Senate more likely to be ambiguous? 
Members in the House have a specific constituency and a similar set of preferences. 
Therefore, they are more likely to accurately reflect their constituency’s preferences in 
Congress. By contrast, members in the Senate have a broader constituency to appeal to. 
As a result, he or she must meet a range of preferences to ensure victory in an upcoming 
election. Furthermore, Senate races are often more competitive with their “longer terms, 
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greater visibility, and more serious opponents” than House races (Nice 1984, 101). Thus, 
senators are more invested in their careers. 
Additionally, the dynamics of each term and the chamber are worth consideration. 
Members of the House serve two-year terms. Members of the Senate enjoy six-year 
terms. Thus, members of the House should refrain from overplaying ambiguity, but six-
year terms afford senators a leeway to practice ambiguity. Still, actions and members of 
the Senate are more publicized than the House. Therefore, House members may be more 
ambiguous than Senate members.  
Fourth, what types of legislation are more likely to be regarded with ambiguity?  
Fifth, are salient issues more likely to be met with ambiguity? These questions are 
dependent upon the political party and ideology of the congressional member and the 
party in control of the chamber. Furthermore, it is possible that these two questions 
overlap.  
Sixth, has the emergence of polarization increased the need for ambiguity? This 
question depends on the likelihood that the electorate is polarized and demands loyalty to 
the party. Scholarship on a polarized electorate remains hotly debated (Fiorina, Abrams, 
and Pope 2008; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). Regardless, bipartisan action may be 
met with reprisal by the voter and provide an advantage to challengers in a primary 
election.  
Seventh, are congressional members capitalizing on the timing of ambiguity 
within their term? Astute members of Congress should avoid taking clear positions closer 
to elections when salient issues emerge and are highlighted by the media. Definitive 
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actions are likely to be negatively scrutinized by the electorate, media, and challenger. 
Still, members of Congress may take clearer positions closer to elections to boost their 
reputation among the constituency. This ensures positive scrutiny by the electorate, 
neutral media attention, and a less threatening challenger. 
Eighth, are ambiguous members bringing more money to their states or districts 
because they are forcing party leaders to make concessions to strike a better deal? In 
times of narrow majorities in Congress, ambiguous members may be at a unique 
advantage. They are fair game to both parties who vie for their support. As a result, their 
votes may be bought by party leaders. The final legislation may grant the ambiguous 
member’s electorate greater benefits that the initial legislation could not. 
Finally, the ninth question is an extension of the eighth question. Research has 
shown women are more effective at returning federal money to their districts (Anzia and 
Berry 2011). Thus, do ambiguous women have a greater advantage than their male 
counterparts when party leaders attempt to buy their votes? 
The questions I presented above are intended to advance the topic of ambiguity in 
Congress. They may also enhance theories on candidate ambiguity at the local, state, and 
national levels. Still, the study of ambiguity as an aspect of congressional behavior 
deserves further exploration. This research examined the rate of ambiguity among 
members of Congress that shared the president’s party based on the president’s approval 
ratings. Finding some support for this theory, it is important to note that there are likely 












Table 3. HOUSE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variables n Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Pres. Appr. * Same Party 6,001,525 23.6 26.2 0 87.1 
Pres. Approval 6,001,525 50.0 11.2 28 87.1 
Divided Government 6,001,525 .706 .455 0 1 






















Table 4. SENATE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variables n Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Pres. Appr. * Same Party 647,744 25.9 26.8 0 87.1 
Pres. Approval 647,744 51.5 11.2 28 87.1 
Divided Government 647,744 .692 .462 0 1 




















***Variation in observations between ambiguity and the remaining variables are 
explained by VoteView’s setup. In VoteView, values under ambiguity represent the 
likelihood a member of Congress will vote for or against legislation. For some 
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